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Abstract
We present current methods for estimating treatment effects and spillover effects under “interference”,
a term which covers a broad class of situations in which a unit’s outcome depends not only on treatments
received by that unit, but also on treatments received by other units. To the extent that units react to each
other, interact, or otherwise transmit effects of treatments, valid inference requires that we account for
such interference, which is a departure from the traditional assumption that units’ outcomes are affected
only by their own treatment assignment. Interference and associated spillovers may be a nuisance or they
may be of substantive interest to the researcher. In this chapter, we focus on interference in the context of
randomized experiments. We review methods for when interference happens in a general network setting.
We then consider the special case where interference is contained within a hierarchical structure. Finally,
we discuss the relationship between interference and contagion. We use the interference R package and
simulated data to illustrate key points. We consider efficient designs that allow for estimation of the
treatment and spillover effects and discuss recent empirical studies that try to capture such effects.
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1 Introduction
We present current methods for identifying causal effects under “interference”, a term which covers a very
broad class of situations in which a unit’s outcomes depend not only on treatments received by that unit, but
also on treatments received by other units (Cox, 1958). This includes effects that spill over from one unit to
others. For example, in an agricultural experiment, fertilizer applied to one plot of land may literally spill
over into other plots assigned to different treatments, therefore affecting their yields. Interference may arise
from interactions between units, such as through social influence processes. For example, in the context of an
election, exposing a voter to a persuasive appeal may affect what that voter says to their friends, which in
turn may affect the friends’ outcomes.
Interference represents a departure from the traditional assumption wherein the potential outcomes that
would be observed for a unit in either the treatment or control condition, depend only on that unit’s, and not
the overall, treatment assignment. This traditional assumption is implied by what Rubin (1990) refers to as
the “stable unit treatment value assumption” (SUTVA).
Figure 1 displays channels through which interference might occur. The black elements in Figure 1 show
a directed acyclic graph that captures potential spillover effects onto unit 2 from a treatment assigned to unit
1. We assume an experiment where unit 1’s treatment, Z1, is randomly assigned. Then, the effect of this
treatment, captured by the black arrows flowing from Z1, could be to alter unit 1’s own outcome, Y1, as well
as unit 2’s outcome, Y2. This could happen via a pathway in which Y1 mediates the effect of Z1 on Y2. Such
outcome-mediated effects are known as contagion effects, which we briefly discuss toward the end of this
chapter. Or it could be that Z1 affects Y2 through channels that do not go through Y1. Spillover includes the
sum total of the effects from Z1 to Y2. The gray elements in Figure 1 show that spillovers could be running
from Z2 to Y1 as well. Finally, the variable U captures other variables that might induce dependency between
Y1 and Y2. It is important to recognize that these sources of outcome dependence or clustering are wholly
distinct from spillover. However, such confounders undermine the ability to isolate contagion effects from
other spillover mechanisms, a point to which we return below.
In this chapter, we assume that the researcher is interested in estimating spillover effects. We focus on
randomized experiments for which we have some understanding of the structure through which spillover effects
occur. In the first section, we review cases where the interference network is known completely, but then can
take almost arbitrary form. In the second section, we review cases where we know only that interference
is fully contained within the boundaries of strata that partition the population, but then the interference
network within these strata is unknown. The final section makes some points regarding the attempt to
distinguish contagion effects from other forms of spillover. We do not discuss work that examine causal
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Figure 1: Causal graph illustrating interference mechanisms and confounding mechanisms when treatment
(Z) is randomized.
effects in situations where the interference network is fully hidden as in Sävje, Aronow and Hudgens (2017).
Moreover, our emphasis is on large-N estimation of spillover effects, and so we omit discussion of methods
that work off the experimental randomization to develop exact tests for interference effects (Rosenbaum,
2007; Aronow, 2012; Bowers, Fredrickson and Panagopoulos, 2013; Athey, Eckles and Imbens, 2018). These
methods either restrict themselves to testing for interference, or require strong assumptions (for example, a
finite-dimensional model of causal effects) to attain interval estimates.
2 Three Motivating Examples
We begin with three examples that allow us to illustrate key points. The first example is a study by Paluck,
Shepherd and Aronow (2016), who study the effects of an antibullying program in New Jersey schools.
The authors began by measuring the schools’ social networks. They did this by asking students to report
which other students they chose to spend time with in previous weeks. The experiment then randomly
assigned schools to the antibullying program, and within schools, randomly selected students from an eligible
subpopulation to actively participate in the program. Assuming the network measures are accurate, the
experiment identifies spillover effects onto students who themselves do not participate in the program but
have peers who do. The ability to get at such spillover effects depends on the accuracy of the network measure
and the ways that one specifies potential exposure to spillovers on the basis of this network. If the researcher
assumes that only peers of program recipients can be affected by the anticonflict intervention, but in fact
peers of peers can be affected as well, then inferences about the program’s direct and spillover effects may
be biased. The section below on arbitrary interference networks discuss this issue along with associated
sensitivity analyses.
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Figure 2: Figure from Sandefur (2018) displaying long-term spillover effects from an unconditional cash
transfer program, as reported in Haushofer and Shapiro (2018).
As a second example, consider Figure 2, which shows the results of an experimental study in Kenya
by Haushofer and Shapiro (2018) on the long-term (after 3 years) effects of unconditional cash transfers.
The outcome here is monthly household consumption. In this study, villages were randomly selected to be
treated, and then within these villages, a half of the households were randomly selected to receive about
400 USD in cash. As Figure 2 shows, average monthly consumption in treatment villages, pooling recipient
and non-recipient households, is $211 (green horizontal line), which is similar to the average in control
villages ($217). But the inter-village comparison masks variation within treated villages. Recipient households
consume $235 per month on average, while non-recipient neighbors in treatment villages consume $188 per
month on average. Given that the treatment was assigned in a manner that randomized both across villages
and within villages, these three types of households (recipients, neighbors, and control villages) are ex ante
exchangeable, in which case the experiment yields an unbiased estimate of a negative within-village spillover
effect.
This example illustrates a few additional nuances. First, when spillovers are present, one needs to think
about effects in terms of overall assignment patterns. Neither the comparison between directly treated
households and control village households nor directly treated households and untreated households in
treated villages gets at “the” effect of cash transfers. Effects depend on exactly whom and at what rate
potentially interacting households are treated. This particular experiment gives evidence on outcomes for
treated households and untreated neighboring households when the within-village treatment rate is 50%.
Were the quantity of policy interest to be how outcomes change going from 0% to 100% treatment rates, for
example, it is not clear that the experiment could directly speak to that. Second, households presumably
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differ not only in how they would respond after receiving the transfer per se, but also in how they would
respond given the precise set of other households that receive the transfer. Suppose the village included two
business partners, and business production exhibited increasing returns to input capital. Then, outcomes
would presumably differ if the households of both partners were treated as compared to only one partner being
treated. Outcomes among the untreated neighbors in treatment villages depend not only on the treatment
saturation rate (50%), but also the precise configuration of treated and untreated households. This raises the
question of how to interpret effects such as those presented in Figure 2—what counterfactual comparisons are
being characterized, exactly? The section below on partial interference addresses these issues.
A third example is the experiment by Nickerson (2008) on potential contagion in voter turnout. Households
with two registered voters were first randomly assigned to one of three conditions: a get-out-the-vote (GOTV)
doorstep appeal, a doorstep appeal to promote recycling, or a control condition in which nothing was done to
the household. The recycling appeal was meant to serve as a “placebo” treatment to account for the fact that
only some households, and particularly individuals with specific characteristics would open the door to receive
an appeal. The experiment thus yielded data on subjects who opened the door and were thus direct recipients
of either the GOTV or recycling appeals, their housemates who were not there at the door, and then the
full set of control households. Comparing voter turnout among housemates of those who directly received
the GOTV appeal to housemates of those who received the recycling appeal, one can estimate whether the
GOTV treatment spilled over from the direct recipient to the housemate. Insofar as there is an effect, one
may wonder if the mechanism at work is contagion—that is, it is the voting intention of the direct recipient
that went on to affect the voting intention of the housemate—or some other mechanism. This distinction
between mechanisms would have implications for theories about norms that support voting behavior. In the
section below on contagion, we return to this experiment and review assumptions needed to isolate contagion
effects.
3 Formal Setting
We now present a formal framework for defining causal effects under interference. Suppose an experimenter
intervenes on a finite population U of units indexed by i = 1, . . . , N . Let us suppose further that the
intervention is defined by a treatment assignment vector z = (z1, . . . , zN )′, where zi ∈ {1, 0} specifies the
possible treatment values that unit i receives. Let Ω be the set of treatment assignment vectors z with
|Ω| = 2N . An experimental design is a plan for randomly selecting a particular value of z from the 2N
different possibilities with predetermined probability pz—for example, Bernoulli assignment (i.e., coin flips)
or completely randomized assignment strategy. Therefore, Ω = {z : pz > 0} and the realized treatment
5
assignment Z = (Z1, . . . , ZN )′ is a random vector with support Ω and Pr(Z = z) = pz. For example, with
a population of size N = 10, and an experimental design that randomly assigns without replacement a
proportion p = 0.2 to treatment condition zi = 1 with uniform probability, there are
(
N
pN
)
= 45 possible
treatment assignments (|Ω| = 45) and the realized treatment assignment Z has pz = 145 . The experimental
design characterizes precisely the probability distribution of the assigned treatments. In experiments, this is
determined by the researcher and is therefore known.
To analyze the effect of different treatment assignments, we compare the different outcomes they produce.
These potential outcomes are defined for each unit i as the elements in the image of a function that maps
assignment vectors to a real valued outcomes, yi : Ω → R. Particularly, yi(z) is the response of unit i to
assignment z. For convenience, let z−i = (zi, . . . , zi−1, zi+1, . . . , zN )′ denote the (N − 1)-element vector
that removes the ith element from z. Then, the potential outcome yi(z) can equivalently be expressed as
yi(zi; z−i). Continuing with the example of the cash transfer program above, this quantity would be the
potential consumption of household i given its assignment as a transfer recipient or non-recipient (zi) and the
treatment assignment of all other households (z−i), including those inside and outside household i’s village.
Traditional analyses of experiments, and other chapters in this volume, assume no interference, in which
case the potential outcome yi(z) is restricted to be affected only by i’s own treatment. That is, with
no interference, for any two treatment assignments z and z′, for which zi remains unchanged, we have
yi(zi; z−i) = yi(zi; z′−i) for all i ∈ {1, . . . , N}. When interference is present, there exist some units i ∈ U for
which yi(zi; z−i) 6= yi(zi; z′−i), that is fixing the treatment of i while changing other units’ treatment results
in changes of i’s outcome.
Let Yi denote the observed outcome of unit i, where the observed outcome is related to the potential
outcomes as Yi = yi(Z) = yi(Zi;Z−i), where Z−i denotes the vector Z net of its ith element. In the case of
no interference, Yi = yi(Zi). Therefore, when interference is present, we need to account for others’ treatment
assignments as well.
4 Arbitrary But Known Interference Networks
This section reviews estimation methods in a setting where interference occurs over a network of arbitrary
structure, but this structure is known. The analysis follows Aronow and Samii (2017). We represent a unit’s
set of interfering units in terms of network ties. Then, depending on the network structure and the treated
units’ network characteristics, different treatment assignments may result in different and arbitrary, but
known, patterns of interference. For example, assuming that interference happens through direct ties between
units, treating any one unit in a fully-connected network generates a pattern in which the treatment of that
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one unit interferes with the treatment of every other unit in the network. In a regular lattice, the treatment
of any one treated unit interferes only with the treatment of that unit’s four nearest neighbors, and in an
irregular network, treatment assignments that treat units with many direct ties generate more interference,
than assignments that treat units with just a few ties.
As in the anticonflict social network experiment of Paluck, Shepherd and Aronow (2016), these methods
require the researcher to measure the network or to have comprehensive information about connections
between experimental units, and to define precise causal effects which reflect the possible types of treatment
exposures that might be induced in the experiment, which in turn requires to make specific assumptions about
the extent of interference. The goal is to estimate exposure-specific causal effects—for the anticonflict program,
for example, we might estimate effects on students for whom at least one peer is a direct program participant,
or for whom exactly two peers are participants, etc. Knowing the treatment assignment distribution allows one
to account for potential sources of confounding that arise from heterogeneity across units in their likelihood
of falling into different exposure conditions (for example, heterogeneity in terms of students’ number of
connections with other students). The sections below explain.
4.1 Exposure Mapping
To determine each unit’s treatment exposure under a given treatment assignment, Aronow and Samii (2017)
define an exposure mapping that maps the set of assignment vectors and unit-specific traits to an exposure
value: f : Ω×Θ→ ∆, where θi ∈ Θ quantifies relevant traits of unit i such as the number of direct ties to
other units in the network and, possibly, weights assigned to each of these ties. The set ∆ contains all of the
possible treatment-induced exposures that may be generated in the experiment, and its cardinality depends
on the nature of interference. For example, with no interference and a binary treatment the exposure mapping
ignores unit specific traits f(z, θi) = zi, producing two possible exposure values for each unit: no exposure
(or control condition, zi = 0) and direct exposure (or treatment condition, zi = 1), in which case ∆ = {0, 1}.
Now, consider interference that occurs through direct peer connections. Then, θi is a column vector equal to
the transpose of unit i’s row in a network adjacency matrix (which captures i’s direct connections to other
units), and the exposure mapping f(z, θi) can be simply defined to capture direct exposure to treatment—or
the effect of being assigned to treatment—and indirect exposure—or the effect of being exposed to treatment
of peers.1 An example of such an exposure mapping (and by no means the only possibility) is the following,
whereby indirect exposure occurs when at least one peer is treated:
1Note that the meaning of “direct” and “indirect” in the interference setting is different than in the mediation setting reviewed
in Glynn’s chapter in this volume.
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f(z, θi) =

d11(Direct + Indirect Exposure) : ziI(z′θi > 0) = 1,
d10(Isolated Direct Exposure) : ziI(z′θi = 0) = 1,
d01(Indirect Exposure) : (1− zi)I(z′θi > 0) = 1,
d00(No Exposure) : (1− zi)I(z′θi = 0) = 1
For this particular case ∆ = {d11, d10, d01, d00}. This characterization of exposures is “reduced form” in that
it does not distinguish between the mechanisms through which spillover effects occur.
Specification of the exposure mapping requires substantive consideration of the data generating process.
Manski (2013) discusses subtleties that arise in specifying exposure mappings. For example, the author shows
how models of simultaneous endogenous choice (due to homophily or common external shocks) can produce
restrictions on the potential outcomes yi(dk), and therefore imply that potential outcomes may vary in ways
that an otherwise intuitive exposure mapping may fail to capture.
Because units occupy different positions in the interference network, their probabilities of being in one
or another exposure condition vary, even if treatment is randomly assigned. Insofar as network position
also affects outcomes, then such differences in exposure probabilities need to be taken into account when
estimating exposure-specific causal effects. Otherwise, the analysis would be confounded. We show here that
when the random assignment mechanism is known, then these exposure probabilities are also known. This
allows one to condition on the exposure probabilities directly. To see this, define the exposure that unit i
receives as Di = f(Z, θi), a random variable with support ∆i ⊆ ∆ and for which Pr(Di = d) = pii(d). For
each unit i there is a vector, pii = (pii(d1), . . . , pii(dK))′, with the probability of i being subject to each of the
possible exposures in {d1, . . . , dK}. Aronow and Samii (2017) call pii i’s generalized probability of exposure.
For example, the exposure mapping defined above gives rise to pii = (pii(d11), pii(d10), pii(d01), pii(d00))′. We
observe the unit-specific traits (θi) necessary to define exposures for any treatment assignment vector, and
the probability of each possible treatment assignment vector (pz) is known. This allows us to compute pii(dk)
as the expected proportion of treatment assignments which induce exposure dk for unit i. When the set of
possible treatment assignment vectors Ω is small, this can be computed exactly. When Ω is large, one can
approximate the pii(dk) values with arbitrary precision by taking a large number of random draws from Ω.
Aronow and Samii (2017) discuss considerations for how many draws are needed so as to keep biases small.
This Monte Carlo method may in some cases require a prohibitive number of draws (for example, if |∆| is
large), but for some specific designs and exposure mappings it may be possible to compute the pii(dk) values
via a dynamic program, as in Ugander et al. (2013).
The following toy example illustrates how to compute the exposure received by each unit and the
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generalized probability of exposure using the interference package for R (Zonszein, Aronow and Samii,
2019). Suppose we have a set of N = 10 units, we randomly assign (without replacement) a proportion p = 0.2
to treatment condition zi = 1 with uniform probability. In this case, the realized treatment assignment Z′
shows that units 6 and 9 are directly treated.
N <- 10
p <- 0.2
Z <- make_tr_vec_permutation(N, p, R = 1, seed = 56)
Z
[,1] [,2] [,3] [,4] [,5] [,6] [,7] [,8] [,9] [,10]
[1,] 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
Now let’s suppose that units are connected according to a draw from a Watts-Strogatz model—a random
graph generation model that produces networks with “small world” properties: high clustering in network
interconnections and short average path lengths that connect any two arbitrary nodes (units). We assume an
undirected network, that is, if i has a direct connection with j, then j has one with i, and that on average
each unit is directly connected to four other units. A visualization of such a network is given in Figure 3, and
its adjacency matrix is:
adj_matrix <- make_adj_matrix(N, model = 'small_world', seed = 492)
adj_matrix
[,1] [,2] [,3] [,4] [,5] [,6] [,7] [,8] [,9] [,10]
[1,] 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
[2,] 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
[3,] 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0
[4,] 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0
[5,] 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0
[6,] 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
[7,] 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0
[8,] 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1
[9,] 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1
[10,] 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0
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Figure 3: Example of interference network with ten units. Each edge (link) represents a possible channel
through which spillover effects might transmit.
For the purposes of our example, the adjacency matrix captures Θ, while each row defines θ′i. The reason
is that in our example, exposures are defined strictly through the combination of the treatment assignment
and the individual rows of the adjacency matrix. In principle, exposure mappings could take other factors into
account, such as covariates that are not related to the adjacency matrix or other properties of the adjacency
matrix besides a unit’s row. Returning to the example, from θ′6 we know that unit 6 has edges to each of
units 3, 4 and 5. Using the adjacency matrix (adj_matrix) and Z (Z) as arguments in the exposure mapping
function defined above, we obtain the received exposure for every unit. The argument hop = 1 describes a
data generating process in which indirect exposure happens through the existence of any direct peer receiving
treatment:
D <- make_exposure_map_AS(adj_matrix, Z, hop = 1)
D
dir_ind1 isol_dir ind1 no
[1,] 0 0 0 1
[2,] 0 0 0 1
[3,] 0 0 1 0
[4,] 0 0 1 0
[5,] 0 0 1 0
[6,] 0 1 0 0
[7,] 0 0 1 0
[8,] 0 0 1 0
[9,] 0 1 0 0
[10,] 0 0 1 0
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We can see that the received exposure for units 3, 4 and 5 is d01 ≡ Indirect Exposure, given their direct
connection to unit 6, who is directly treated. Likewise for units 7, 8 and 10 who are degree-one neighbors of
unit 9. We can also see that there are no units in exposure condition d11, because the two directly treated
units (6 and 9) are not connected to each other.
Now, to obtain the generalized probability of exposure of each unit we need the exposure mapping function
and its arguments: the adjacency matrix and the set of all possible treatment assignments. When |Ω| is large
we can approximate Ω producing random replicate z’s. In this case we could easily compute Ω because there
are only 45 possible treatment assignment profiles, but for expository purposes, we work with 30 random
draws from Ω without replacement (setting the arguments R = 30 and allow_repetitions = FALSE).
omega <- make_tr_vec_permutation(
N, p,
R = 30, seed = 420, allow_repetitions = FALSE
)
prob_exposure <- make_exposure_prob(
omega,
adj_matrix,
make_exposure_map_AS,
list(hop = 1)
)
make_prob_exposure_cond(prob_exposure)
[,1] [,2] [,3] [,4] [,5] [,6]
dir_ind1 0.09677419 0.12903226 0.1612903 0.09677419 0.12903226 0.09677419
isol_dir 0.19354839 0.09677419 0.1290323 0.12903226 0.06451613 0.12903226
ind1 0.41935484 0.61290323 0.6774194 0.70967742 0.67741935 0.45161290
no 0.38709677 0.25806452 0.1290323 0.16129032 0.22580645 0.41935484
[,7] [,8] [,9] [,10]
dir_ind1 0.1290323 0.12903226 0.1290323 0.1290323
isol_dir 0.2258065 0.09677419 0.1612903 0.1290323
ind1 0.4193548 0.64516129 0.6129032 0.4516129
no 0.3225806 0.22580645 0.1935484 0.3870968
The columns capture pii, the expected proportion of treatment assignments which result in each exposure.
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We can see that the exposure probabilities are very heterogeneous. In this particular case, because the
exposure mapping only takes into account whether a unit is treated itself and then has at least one treated
peer, the exposure probabilities have a close relationship to the number of direct connections with peers—i.e.,
a unit’s network degree. Exposure mappings could be more complex, requiring that one account for different
traits of units (connections to treated peers of peers and other covariates such as gender or age, for example),
in which case exposure effects would not necessarily map so straightforwardly to network degree.
4.2 Spillover Effects as Contrasts Across Exposures
We now formally define spillover effects as contrasts between averages of individual potential outcomes
across different exposures. To estimate exposure-specific average potential outcomes, the exposure mapping
has to fully characterize interference. This condition implies that K treatment exposures give rise to at
most K distinct potential outcomes for each unit i in the population. We write the potential outcomes as
(yi(d1), . . . , yi(dK)), where yi(dk) = yi(z) for all units, k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, and z ∈ Ω such that f(z, θi) = dk.
Then, observed outcomes must relate back to the potential outcomes: Yi =
∑K
k=1 I(Di = dk)yi(dk). The
average potential outcome at any exposure level k is then µ(dk) = 1N
∑N
i=1 yi(dk), and the average causal
effect of being in exposure condition dk as opposed to exposure condition dl is
τ(dk, dl) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
yi(dk)− 1
N
N∑
i=1
yi(dl) = µ(dk)− µ(dl).
To estimate
∑N
i=1 yi(dk) = yT (dk) we have to take into account that we observe yi(dk) only for those with
Di = dk, and that the probability of observing yi(dk) is not equal across units. Using the exposure mapping
from the example above, the probability of observing yi(d10) = yi(Isolated Direct Exposure) is smaller for
those with more direct connections to other units in the network. But as we saw above, by design, we can
calculate the probability of the exposure conditions for each individual. Then, assuming that all units have
nonzero probabilities of being subject to each of the K exposures2, yT (dk) can be estimated without bias
with the Horvitz-Thompson inverse probability estimator:
ŷTHT (dk) =
N∑
i=1
I(Di = dk)
Yi
pii(dk)
.
In cases where |Ω| is high, and therefore we use sampling from Ω to obtain estimates pˆii(·), those estimates
are used in place of the true pii(·) values. A Horvitz-Thompson estimator of the average unit-level causal
2If pii(dk) = 0 for some units, then estimation of average potential outcomes µ(dk) must be restricted to the subset of units
for which pii(dk) > 0. Interpretation of contrasts of average potential outcomes as causal effects would require doing so for units
such that pii(d) > 0 for all d ∈ ∆′ ⊂ ∆; for example, when estimating τ(dk, dl) one would need to restrict analysis to units with
both pii(dk) > 0 and pii(dl) > 0.
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effect of exposure k versus l, τ(dk, dl), is therefore
τ̂HT (dk, dl) = µ̂HT (dk)− µ̂HT (dl) = 1
N
[
ŷTHT (dk)− ŷTHT (dl)
]
.
Continuing with the previous example, we show how to compute this estimator. We do so using simulated
potential outcomes that exhibit effect heterogeneity and that vary in units’ network degree, in which case
naive estimates that do not account for probabilities of exposure would be biased. Specifically, we generate
a variable with random values from an absolute standard normal distribution which is correlated with the
unit’s first and second order degree—the number of peers and peers of peers, respectively (for which we
use the arguments adj_matrix and make_corr_out in the function below). This variable determines the
potential outcome under the d00 condition. To build heterogeneous effects into the analysis, we assume
what Rosenbaum (1999) refers to as “dilated effects” such that yi(d11) = 2× yi(d00), yi(d10) = 1.5× yi(d00),
yi(d01) = 1.25× yi(d00). (The multipliers of yi(d00) can be changed by passing a vector with 3 numbers to
multipliers in the function below).
potential_outcomes <- make_dilated_out(
adj_matrix, make_corr_out, seed = 1101,
multipliers = NULL, hop = 1
)
From the potential outcomes and received exposures (D), we get the observed outcomes.
observed_outcomes <- rowSums(D*t(potential_outcomes))
Next, we compute τ̂HT (d10, d00), which isolates the effect of direct exposure in the absence of any
interaction with indirect exposure, as well as τ̂HT (d01, d00), which isolates the effect of indirect exposure in
the absence of any interaction with direct exposure. In this case, we cannot compute τ̂HT (d11, d00)—the
interactive effect of direct and indirect exposure—because in this small scale example no unit received
exposure d11.
yT_HT <- estimates(D, observed_outcomes, prob_exposure, hop = 1)$yT_ht
The object yT_HT is a named numeric vector which contains the values of ŷTHT (dk) for dk = d11, d10, d01, d00
in that order. Therefore, in order to compute τ̂HT , we can take the difference of each of these values with the
value of exposure condition d00(No Exposure) and then divide by the number of units N .
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tau_HT <- ((1/N)*(yT_HT-yT_HT['no'])[names(yT_HT)!='no'])
tau_HT
dir_ind1 isol_dir ind1
NA 41.61043 39.51643
In fact, the estimates function already computes τ̂HT directly:
estimates(D, observed_outcomes, prob_exposure, hop=1)$tau_ht
dir_ind1 isol_dir ind1
NA 41.61043 39.51643
The estimator τ̂HT (dk, dl) is unbiased when is estimated with pii(dk) rather than pˆii(dk). As mentioned
above, when estimated with the latter, the estimator is not unbiased, but the bias becomes negligible
with a sufficiently large number of replicates R. We implement variance estimators for Var
[
ŷTHT (dk)
]
and Var [τ̂HT (dk, dl)] as derived in Equation 11 of Aronow and Samii (2017). These are conservative
approximations to the exact variances that are guaranteed to have non-negative bias relative to the variance
of the randomization distribution of the estimators. Because unbiased estimators for Var
[
ŷTHT (dk)
]
are only
identified when the joint exposure probabilities of every pair of units is positive, it is necessary to add a
correction term to V̂ar
[
ŷTHT (dk)
]
. Second, because the Cov
[
ŷTHT (dk), ŷTHT (dl)
]
is always unidentified, we use
an approximation. Both of these corrections, contribute to the non-negative bias of the variance estimator.
We also implement the constant effects variance estimator derived in Aronow (2013). This estimator operates
under the assumption that exposure effects do not vary across subjects, and therefore yi(dk) = yi(dl)+τ(dk, dl)
for every unit i. Then, one can estimate the variance by either plugging the estimated τ(dk, dl) values into
the expression of the variance or using them to reconstruct the full schedule of potential outcomes and then
simulating new treatment assignments to approximate the distribution of effect estimates. In the following
applications, we take the maximum between the constant effects variance estimator and the conservative
variance estimator developed in Aronow and Samii (2017). Confidence intervals are based on a large-N normal
approximation: τ̂HT (dk, dl)± z(1−α)/2
√
V̂ar [τ̂HT (dk, dl)].
Asymptotic convergence of these estimators, and therefore the reliability of normal approximations for
inference, depend on whether outcome dependence across units is limited. In particular, consistency of
τ̂HT (dk, dl) follows from limits on the amount of pairwise dependency in exposure conditions induced by both
the design and the exposure mapping as the sample size increases. Going back to the antibullying program
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Table 1: Comparing Horvitz-Thompson to Hajek Estimator, Using Approximate Exposure Probabilities
Estimator Estimand True-Value Average-Value Bias SD RMSE MeanSE
Horvitz-Thompson τ(d11, d00) 58.12 57.33 -0.78 45.32 45.32 45.94
Horvitz-Thompson τ(d10, d00) 29.06 29.07 0.01 26.60 26.60 33.11
Horvitz-Thompson τ(d01, d00) 14.53 14.66 0.13 10.45 10.45 10.33
Hajek τ(d11, d00) 58.12 59.41 1.29 36.66 36.68 34.07
Hajek τ(d10, d00) 29.06 28.92 -0.14 21.55 21.55 25.09
Hajek τ(d01, d00) 14.53 14.85 0.32 8.38 8.39 8.41
Note:
Horvitz–Thompson estimator with maximum between conservative variance estimator and constant
effects variance estimator. Hajek estimator with linearized variance estimator. True-Value = Value of
estimand. Average-Value = Value of estimator. SD = Empirical standard deviation from simulation.
RMSE = Root-mean-square error. MeanSE = mean standard error estimate. Estimators use
approximate exposure probabilities calculated by drawing 10000 treatment assignments without
replacement.
experiment of Paluck, Shepherd and Aronow (2016), this condition implies that as new students are added to
a school, the new peer connections that result between them an existing students cannot be too extensive.
An alternative to the Horvitz-Thompson estimator is the Hajek estimator, which improves efficiency with
a small cost in terms of finite sample bias. This estimator is a ratio approximation of the Horvitz-Thompson:
µ̂H(dk) =
∑N
i=1 I(Di = dk) Yipii(dk)∑N
i=1 I(Di = dk) 1pii(dk)
.
In the Horvitz-Thompson estimator µ̂HT (dk) is high variance because some randomizations yield units
with extremely high values of the weights 1/pii(dk). The Hajek refinement allows the denominator of the
estimator to vary according to the sum of the weights 1/pii(dk), therefore shrinking the magnitude of the
estimator when its value is large, and increasing the magnitude of the estimator when its value is small.
We extend the example developed above to consider a more realistic sample size. In what follows here
and in the following sections, we use a set of N = 400 units and we randomly assign without replacement a
proportion p = 0.1 to treatment condition zi = 1 with uniform probability. As in the previous example, the
network is modeled as small-world with each unit directly connected on average to four other units, and the
potential outcomes follow the “dilated effects” scenario. We set the number of replications to R = 10000 to
compute exposure probabilities, and run 3000 simulated replications of the whole experiment.
The result of the simulation shown in Table 1 illustrates that the Hajek estimator is more efficient than
the Horvitz-Thompson estimator. The empirical standard deviation from simulation is smaller for the Hajek
estimator, and the decrease in variance is with little cost in bias as indicated by a smaller root-mean-square
error. Moreover, the variance estimator is consistent, given that the mean of the standard error estimate
approaches the empirical standard deviation from simulation.
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4.3 Misspecified exposure mappings
We now consider the implications of misspecified exposure mappings. Proposition 8.1 in Aronow and Samii
(2017) show what happens when an exposure condition Di = dk specified by the experimenter is actually
consistent with multiple potential outcomes for unit i, in which case the exposure mapping is too coarse.
Here, we examine these issues in the context of our running example. We consider the case where one
assumes that interference happens only through direct peer connections (first-degree interference), but in
fact units are exposed to treatment of their direct peers and to treatment of peers of their direct peers (it is
second-degree). We also consider what happens when the experimenter ignores interference, but in fact it is
first- or second-degree.
Let us begin with an exposure mapping as above with four exposures for first-degree interference (d11, d10,
d01, d00), and then another exposure mapping with eight exposures based on second-order interference (d111,
d110, d101, d100, d011, d010 d001, d000), and finally a no-interference exposure mapping with only two exposures
(d1, d0). Then, suppose two possible true data generating processes, with one exhibiting only first-degree
interference and the other exhibiting second-degree interference. The exposure mapping is misspecified when
the type of interference assumed by the experimenter does not match the true data generating process. This
gives rise to six scenarios, two of which have correct exposure mapping specifications and the rest being cases
of misspecification.
To define a coherent notion of bias under misspecification, one needs to define quantities of interest in
terms of treatment regimes. In our case, we consider the contrast between average outcomes under 100%
treatment saturation versus 0% saturation:
τ(1,0) = 1
N
N∑
i=1
yi(1)− yi(0),
where the 1 and 0 are meant to denote that 100% or 0% of units are assigned to treatment, respectively.
When the true data generating process involves no interference, then τ(1,0) is equivalent to the usual
average treatment effect (ATE). Under interference, this is not the case. When the true data generating
process involves only the first-degree spillover as per our running example, then τ(1,0) = τ(d11, d00). With
second-degree spillover, τ(1,0) = τ(d111, d000). Misspecification will result in working with inappropriate
contrasts to estimate τ(1,0). For example, suppose the true data generating process is first-degree, but one
assumes no interference. Then, one would mistakenly take the potential outcomes yi(d11) to be equivalent
to yi(d10), and use a mixture of such outcomes in estimating the desired average of yi(1) outcomes. To see
this, consider estimating the population mean when everyone is treated, µ(1), using a Horvitz-Thompson
16
estimator (which we use here for simplicity, results for the Hajek estimator would be along the same lines).
Then, if we assume no interference, we would compute
̂µHT,None(1) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
I(Zi = 1)
Yi
pii
= 1
N
N∑
i=1
(
I(Di = d11)
yi(d11)
pii
+ I(Di = d10)
yi(d10)
pii
)
,
where pii = Pr[Zi = 1], while the unbiased estimator would be,
µ̂HT (1) = µ̂HT (d11) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
I(Di = d11)
Yi
pii(d11)
= 1
N
N∑
i=1
I(Di = d11)
yi(d11)
pii(d11)
,
where pii(d11) = Pr[ZiI(Z′θi > 0) = 1].
Therefore, the misspecified ̂µHT,None(1) is biased for µ̂HT (1) insofar as yi(d11) 6= yi(d10) for some i.
When the assumed exposure mapping considers higher-degree interference than the true data-generating
process, the resulting estimator can be unbiased, but with a cost in variance. The reason is that this
misspecified estimator incorporates only a fraction of the available units to construct the potential outcome
average.
Table 2 and Figure 4 illustrate how estimates vary over these different forms of misspecification in our
simulated data. For the sake of completeness, we also present results for another simulation where the
spillover effects are negative (essentially, choosing dilated effects multipliers when simulating outcome data
such that the multipliers for d11 and d01 are smaller than those of d10 and d00, respectively). Looking at
Figure 4, from left to right we plot the distribution of point estimates for τ̂(d1, d0) (assuming no interference),
τ̂H(d11, d00) (assuming first-degree interference), and τ̂H(d111, d000) (assuming second-degree interference).
Then, we vary whether the true data generating process exhibits first- or second-degree interference. In
all cases, the target of inference is τ(1,0). Under first-degree interference, τ(1,0) = τ(d11, d00), and under
second-degree interference τ(1,0) = τ(d111, d000). These variations in data-generating processes are shown
going up and down Figure 4, for the positive spillovers case in the top panel and the negative spillovers
case in the bottom panel. True values of the target quantities are shown with the dashed lines, and the
distributions of estimators over 3000 simulation runs are shown with the histograms. We see that estimators
are centered around the true quantities when the exposure mapping incorporates equal- or higher-degree
interference than the true data generating process. Because the estimator incorporates only a fraction of the
available units to construct the potential outcome average, the variance is higher when the exposure mapping
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Table 2: Mispecifying Exposure Conditions
Spillover Estimand Estimator True-Value Bias SD RMSE
positive τ(d11, d00) τˆH(d1, d0) 58.12 -23.33 19.06 30.12
positive τ(d11, d00) τˆH(d11, d00) 58.12 1.29 36.66 36.68
positive τ(d11, d00) τˆH(d111, d000) 58.12 3.90 44.14 44.30
positive τ(d111, d000) τˆH(d1, d0) 72.65 -32.21 21.42 38.68
positive τ(d111, d000) τˆH(d11, d00) 72.65 -6.55 40.92 41.44
positive τ(d111, d000) τˆH(d111, d000) 72.65 4.28 48.95 49.13
negative τ(d11, d00) τˆH(d1, d0) 14.53 14.87 14.73 20.93
negative τ(d11, d00) τˆH(d11, d00) 14.53 0.85 23.36 23.37
negative τ(d11, d00) τˆH(d111, d000) 14.53 2.77 30.23 30.35
negative τ(d111, d000) τˆH(d1, d0) 7.26 23.92 13.65 27.54
negative τ(d111, d000) τˆH(d11, d00) 7.26 6.42 21.27 22.21
negative τ(d111, d000) τˆH(d111, d000) 7.26 2.58 28.05 28.16
Note:
Hajek estimator with linearized variance estimator. True-Value = Value of
estimand. SD = Empirical standard deviation from simulation. RMSE = Root-
mean-square error. Estimators use approximate exposure probabilities computed
by drawing 10000 treatment assignments without replacement from the set of
possible treatment profiles.
considers higher-degree interference than the true data generating process. To the contrary, the estimators
are biased when the exposure mapping considers a lower-degree interference than the true data generating
process. In this case, as we explained above, potential outcomes under different exposure conditions are taken
to be equivalent, and therefore, averaged together by the estimator when constructing the potential outcome
average. With positive spillover the estimators’ bias is negative (top panel), whereas the bias is positive with
a case of negative spillover (bottom panel). For monotonic interference of the kinds considered here, bias is
reduced more by considering exposure mappings with more refined patterns of interference (for example, no
interference vs. first-degree interference), as shown in Theorem 2.3 of Eckles, Karrer and Ugander (2017).
Table 2 presents the evaluation metrics for each of the six scenarios depicted in Figure 4: bias, standard
deviation of simulated estimates and root-mean-square error.
Note that this example uses a relatively small set of units (N = 400), and the unbiased estimators (in this
case, τ̂H(d11, d00), τ̂H(d111, d000)) work with smaller subsets of the data than the coarser, biased estimators
(here, τ̂H(d1, d0)). This is apparent if one looks at the standard deviations (SD) in Table 2. As such, with
these sample sizes, the root-mean-square error is swamped by estimation variance relative to bias. As N gets
larger, this would change: the SD would get smaller, but the bias would remain.
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Figure 4: From left to right the plot shows the distribution of the point estimates for 3000 simulations when
the exposure mapping ignores interference, assumes first-degree, and second-degree interference, respectively.
The top panel is for a case of positive spillover effects, and the bottom panel is for a case of negative spillover
effects. In each panel, the upper-row DGP is first-degree interference and the lower-row DGP is second-degree
interference. The dashed vertical line represents the true value of the target quantity, which is the average
effect of going from no one treated to everyone treated.
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Figure 5: The plot shows the distribution of point estimates for 3000 simulations given different proportions
of missing ties for a case of positive spillover. The dashed vertical line represents the true value of the target
quantity.
4.4 Misspecified network ties
Another type of misspecification is when the network measured by the experimenter is different than the
actual interference network. In this case, the bias of the estimator will increase with the proportion of
mis-measured ties. For example, with positive spillover and an elicited network with missing ties, one would
mistakenly take a mixture of the potential outcomes yi(d01) and yi(d00) in estimating the average of yi(d00),
leading to an overestimate and thereby contributing negative bias for any estimate of an effect relative to
µ(d00).
Figure 5 shows more general consequences of working with network estimates based on a network that is
randomly missing varying proportions of ties in the interference network. The data generating process is
the first-degree interference set-up described above and the figure shows results from 3000 simulation draws,
plotting distributions of point estimates for τ̂H(d01, d00), τ̂H(d10, d00), and τ̂H(d11, d00). The distribution of
point estimates is centered around the target quantity (the dashed line) when the proportion of unmeasured
ties is zero, indicating unbiasedness. However, as the proportion of unmeasured ties increases the distribution’s
shift to the left or right, depending on the net effect of the biases for the estimated potential outcome means.
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4.5 Sensitivity analysis for misspecification
Egami (2017) proposes a sensitivity analysis for misspecification of the exposure mapping due to unobserved
networks. The sensitivity analysis considers a situation where spillover effects occur on an unobserved “offline”
network when the experimenter only observes an “online” network. The case captures situations where
one uses, for example, online social network data like a Twitter follower network to specify the interference
network, but that interference can also occur via offline ties like a network of high school classmates that
is not captured by the online network. The analysis could apply to any situation where the measured
network fails to capture all relevant ties in the true interference network. The sensitivity analysis focuses
on estimating the average network-specific spillover effect (ANSE), which is the average causal effect of
changing the treatment status of neighbors in the online network (for example, status of Twitter ties), without
changing the treatment status of neighbors in the offline network (high school classmates). The analysis also
requires the stratified interference assumption (to which we return below), which assumes that potential
outcomes of unit i are affected by i’s own treatment assignment and only the treated proportion of online and
offline neighbors; the precise set of treated neighbors does not matter. Under this assumption, Egami (2017)
develops parametric and nonparametric sensitivity analysis methods. The parametric method in addition
assumes that the unobserved network spillover effect is linear and additive, and helps to derive simple formal
conditions under which unobserved networks would explain away the estimated ANSE. The nonparametric
method assumes instead that outcomes are just non-negative, and is used to bound the ANSE.
4.6 Efficient designs to estimate effects under interference
We now consider implications of the preceding analysis for designing experiments that estimate exposure-
specific effects efficiently. Let us first consider why such designs are needed. If the goal is to estimate the
average difference in unit potential outcomes under 100% versus 0% treatment saturation, defined as τ(1,0)
above, naive designs can perform poorly. Ugander et al. (2013) show that unit-level designs need not even
yield asymptotically consistent estimators under first-degree interference if degree is also increasing as the
sample size does. The problem is that very few units end up with either all or no first-degree neighbors
treated.
Analogously to designs for the partial interference setting considered below, Ugander et al. (2013) propose
cluster-randomized designs. In this graph cluster randomization the network (or graph) is partitioned into a
set of clusters, such that units closer to each other in the network are assigned to the same cluster, and then
treatment randomization is performed at the cluster level. Estimation then employs the inverse-probability
weighted methods described above. When τ(1,0) is the estimand, graph cluster randomization can lead to
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exponentially (in sample size) lower estimator variance as compared to unit-level random assignment. This is
because under graph cluster randomization, connected units are assigned to the same treatment condition
more often than would happen with unit level assignment, increasing the expected number of units who are
exposed to one of the full neighborhood exposure conditions. On the other hand, assigning units by cluster
can contribute to increases in variance, especially insofar as it means that—due to homophily—units with
similar outcomes will tend to be assigned to one or another exposure condition together. Ugander et al.
(2013) analyze an intuitive graph clustering method, -net clustering, where clusters are formed by finding
a set of units such that all units in the set are at least  hops of each other, and every unit outside the
set is within  − 1 hops of a unit in the set. With  = 3 graph cluster randomization has some desirable
asymptotic properties even as average degree is growing with the sample size. In practice, experimenters can
use many other methods for graph partitioning or community detection, but these are more difficult to study
analytically; Saveski et al. (2017) includes empirical comparison of such methods.
We compare the Horvitz-Thompson and Hajek estimators and their variance for the causal estimand of
full neighborhood exposure, τ(d1, d0), for the case in which units are assigned to treatment via unit-level
randomization as opposed to 3-net clustering randomization. In both cases, our simulation assumes that
treatment assignment has a Bernoulli(1/2) distribution, there are 400 units connected by a small world
network with average degree 4, and units respond to treatment following a dilated effects scenario in which
the outcomes have a positive lower bound and are correlated with the unit’s first and second order degree. To
compute the exposure probabilities, we set the number of replications to R = 10000. We run 3000 simulated
replications of the experiment. The results of the simulation are presented in Table 3. They show that graph
cluster randomization leads to substantially lower estimator variability with no cost in bias as indicated by a
smaller root-mean-square error.
On the other hand, if the exposure model is misspecified, neither design yields unbiased or consistent
estimators; however, under some models in which interference is monotonic, graph cluster randomization can
nonetheless reduce bias at the cost of variance (Eckles, Karrer and Ugander, 2017).
The above discussion considers contrasting 100% versus 0% treatment saturation, for which graph cluster
randomization—and other designs that produce network autocorrelation in treatment—can be advantageous.
Other estimands may motivate quite different experimental designs. For example, if the goal is to estimate
interference effects (e.g., τ(d01, d00)), graph clustered randomization with a perfect partitioning of a network
into its k connected components may make estimation impossible, since all units will have the same treatment
as their neighbors.
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Table 3: Comparing Unit to Cluster Randomization
Randomization Estimator Estimand True-Value Average-Value Bias SD RMSE
Unit Horvitz-Thompson τ(d1, d0) 58.12 55.70 -2.42 139.65 139.65
Cluster Horvitz-Thompson τ(d1, d0) 58.12 57.52 -0.60 61.31 61.30
Unit Hajek τ(d1, d0) 58.12 48.27 -9.85 52.89 53.79
Cluster Hajek τ(d1, d0) 58.12 55.01 -3.10 28.89 29.05
Note:
Unit = unit-level randomization. Cluster = 3-net clustering. Horvitz–Thompson estimator with maximum
between conservative variance estimator and constant effects variance estimator. Hajek estimator with
linearized variance estimator. True-Value = Value of estimand. Average-Value = Value of estimator.
SD = Empirical standard deviation from simulation. RMSE = Root-mean-square error. Estimators use
approximate exposure probabilities computed by drawing 10000 treatment assignments without replacement.
4.7 Empirical Studies
Bond et al. (2012) analyze the influence of peers within a large scale voter-mobilization network experiment
delivering messages to 61 million Facebook users during the day of the 2010 U.S. Congressional Election.
Users were randomly assigned to a social message (98% of users), an informational message (1%) or a control
condition (1%). The two treatment conditions encouraged users to vote, provided a polling-place link, allow
them to express they had voted by clicking an “I voted” button and showed a counter with the number of
users who had previously reported voting. In addition, the social message presented pictures of friends who
had reported voting. The polling-place link was used as a measure of desire to seek information about the
election and the “I voted” button as self-reported voting. Additionally, the turnout of about 10% of the users
was validated with public voting records. The estimated results suggest positive direct effects of the social
message on information seeking, self-reported voting and validated voting, whereas the informational message
did not affect turnout. Results suggest positive spillover effects on “close friends” with whom they interact
frequently on Facebook and who are likely to have real-world, face-to-face relationships, but no effects on
distant friends. The way in which Bond et al. (2012) analyzed spillover effects did not properly account for
direct effects, a problem discussed by Taylor and Eckles (2017) when considering sharp null hypothesis tests
on indirect effects.
A follow up study was conducted by Jones et al. (2017) during the 2012 Presidential Election. In this study,
the experimental conditions were adjusted to better understand the mechanisms that were likely to drive
effects and the analysis of spillover effects corrected the problems with Bond et al. (2012). Instead of treating
the large majority of users with the social message condition and assigning the rest to an informational or
control conditions, this time a 2x2 design varied whether or not individuals saw a post at the top of their
News Feeds that encouraged turnout in a similar way than the social message (the banner condition), and
whether or not users saw individual posts within their News Feed regarding friends’ voting if at least one of
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their friends in the banner condition had clicked on the “I voted” button (the feed condition). In the 2010
experiment, users in the banner condition also saw these messages within their feeds, not allowing to separate
the encouragement from the social effect. Findings suggest that users directly exposed to both the banner
and feed conditions were significantly more likely to have voted than those in the control condition. Spillover
effects happened through those encouraged to vote with the banner condition, whereas the feed treatment
did not spill over to close friends. However, this time there were other differences in the messaging due to
the context of the 2x2 design. For example, messages in the feed condition did not contain the button to
self-report voting or the link to find the polling place. These features would also need to be randomized to
learn more about the differences between indirect effects across the banner and feed conditions.
Coppock, Guess and Ternovski (2016) explore direct and spillover effects of a mobilization campaign on
Twitter on informal political participation, particularly signing an online petition and sharing the petition
link. Followers of an environmental nonprofit advocacy organization were randomly assigned to receive a
private (2/3 of followers) or a public message (1/3), and those receiving the private message were either
primed to have an identity of high commitment (organizer) or of low commitment (follower) in equal shares.
A second manipulation encouraged a random subset of petition signers to share the petition with their own
followers (who are also followers of the environmental organization and who mostly follow one petition signer)
as a way to measure spillover effects among those who actually respond directly to treatment. The design of
this second manipulation reduces the number of exposure conditions that would otherwise be prohibitively
large when the researcher is interested in measuring indirect effects for every possible number of treated users
who are followed (from 0 to 601, according to the largest units’ degree in this network), while accounting
for exposure probabilities, and without parameterizing the response to exposure in the exposure mapping.
Results show that direct messages boost petition signatures and tweet behavior, and that priming the follower
identity is more effective than the organizer identity. Regarding indirect effects there is evidence that signing
the petition was influenced by others’ treatment.
Recent empirical studies exploiting offline networks include Green et al. (2016) who analyze spatial
spillover effects in a series of field experiments testing the impact of lawn signs on vote outcomes by planting
them in randomly selected voting precincts. In this case, to account for indirect effects the experimental
design ensured that two neighboring precincts would not be assigned to direct treatment at the same time.
Baicker (2005) exploits exogenous shocks to state medical spending to explore if spending decisions spill
over to neighboring states, while Isen (2014) leverages a discontinuity from local referendum results to assess
if fiscal decisions of one jurisdiction, particularly taxing and spending, influence the fiscal decisions of its
neighbors, and Rogowski and Sinclair (2012) use the House office lottery (in which newly elected members
select their office spaces in a randomly chosen order) as an instrumental variable to estimate the impact of
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legislative networks on roll call behavior and cosponsorship decisions. The landmark study by Sacerdote
(2001) uses natural random assignment of college roommates to measure spillover effects on educational
performance outcomes.
Other studies have focused on strategies for targeting interventions in networks (i.e., seeding) so as to
capitalize on heterogeneous spillovers. While there is a large theoretical and algorithmic literature on this
problem (influence maximization), triggered by Kempe, Kleinberg and Tardos (2003) who provide a set of
algorithms to maximize behavior diffusion when the researcher has knowledge of the network, there are only
a few randomized experiments. These typically rely on imposing partial interference assumptions (see below)
so that outcomes of different, villages or schools, for example, can be treated as independent observations.
Some studies used random or haphazard assignment of treatment to analyze what types of units produce the
largest spillovers. For example, the previously mentioned antibullying program study by Paluck, Shepherd
and Aronow (2016), measured the network structure of 56 schools in New Jersey to analyze peer diffusion
effects of randomly selected seed groups of students encouraged to take a stance against conflict at school,
finding that students with more direct connections are the most effective at influencing social norms and
behavior among their direct peers and at the school-level. Similarly, Banerjee et al. (2013) study the impact
of the (non-randomized) choice of targeted individuals in the diffusion of participation in a new micro-finance
loan program in India that invited leaders to an informational meeting and asked them to spread information
about the loans. The authors develop a model of word-of-mouth diffusion and apply it to network data of 43
villages, which was collected by surveying households before the start of the program. The model distinguishes
between information passing (learning about the program from neighbors) and endorsement (being influenced
by neighbors’ adoption of the program—what we refer to in this chapter as contagion). This allows one to
tease out the likelihood of information passing through participants as opposed to non-participants, and the
marginal endorsement effect conditional on being informed. These estimates are used to propose measures of
individuals’ effectiveness as seeding points. A smaller number of studies use experiments designed to compare
seeding strategies. For example, Kim et al. (2015) compare the effectiveness of three seeding strategies:
randomly selected individuals, individuals with the highest number of direct connections, and random friends
from a nominated set of friends of random individuals (one-hop targeting), on take-up rates of a public health
program in rural municipalities in Honduras; relying on strong parametric and independence assumptions,
they find that, for one of two behaviors, one-hop targeting performs best. A similar strategy is examined by
Banerjee et al. (2019), but with “ambitious” questions that ask respondents to select someone who would
be good at spreading information; the results provide suggestive evidence that this strategy may increase
spread over random seeding and seeding using village leaders. Other field experiments have been conducted
for diffusion of agricultural knowledge and technology (Beaman and Dillon, 2018; Beaman et al., 2018).
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Chin, Eckles and Ugander (2018) present estimators and optimal experimental designs for studying seeding
strategies that make use of at-most partial network information, as do strategies studied by Kim et al. (2015)
and Banerjee et al. (2019).
5 Partial Interference and Marginal Causal Effects
The analysis in the preceding section is quite general in that it does little to restrict the network over which
interference can occur. The only restrictions was a “local interference” assumption needed for asymptotic
results to hold. The drawback, however, was that one needed to have a specification of the interference
networks that was either complete or that overcompensated for interference in the true data generating
process. In this section, we review the approach of Hudgens and Halloran (2008), who work under the
assumption that the interference network per se is unknown, however one can assume that interference is
limited to occurring within well-defined and non-overlapping groups, for example, villages or households. The
assumption that interference does not cross group boundaries is known as “partial interference” (Sobel, 2006).
If the interference network is not known, then we cannot map each assignment vector z to an exposure, in
which case we cannot estimate exposure-specific effects. Rather, Hudgens and Halloran (2008) define more
agnostic “marginal causal effects” that average over sets of assignment profiles that could, in some unspecified
way, generate spillover effects. This will be made more precise below. The analysis depends on a two-stage
hierarchical design, where groups are first randomly assigned to a level of treatment saturation, and then
units within groups are randomly assigned to treatment with probability equal to their group saturation rate.
5.1 Marginal Causal Effects
In the most general case, each treatment assignment z ∈ Ω generates a distinct potential outcome for unit i.
Under partial interference, the potential outcome for unit i depends only on the treatment assignments for
units in i’s group g. For example, suppose that we have six units, i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, split up into two groups
such that group A contains units 1, 2, and 3, and group B contains units 4, 5, and 6. Assuming that unit
2 in group A was assigned to treatment, partial interference would imply that unit 1’s potential outcomes
would be the same for all assignment vectors in the set
{(0, 1, 0, zi,B) : zi,B ∈ ΩB} = {(0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0), (0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1),
(0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0), (0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1), (0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1), (0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1)},
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where ΩB is the set of possible assignments for group B. At the same time, it may very well be that
assigning unit 3 to treatment instead of unit 2 would have different implications for unit 1’s potential
outcomes—i.e., it may be that y1,A(0, 1, 0, zi,B) 6= y1,A(0, 0, 1, zi,B). Moreover, it would be safe to assume
that either of these might differ from unit 1’s outcome if no one in group A were assigned to treatment,
y1,A(0, 0, 0, zi,B), or if both 2 and 3 were assigned to treatment y1,A(0, 1, 1, zi,B). Now, suppose three fair
coin flips were used to determine whether unit 1, unit 2, or unit 3 should be assigned to treatment. Then,
there is a 50-50 chance that unit 1 would be assigned to control. Conditional on unit 1 being assigned to
control, the expected value of unit 1’s outcome would be the average over the four potential outcomes y1,A
enumerated above. This expected value is unit 1’s marginal (i.e., average) potential outcome given that
unit 1 is not treated but under a regime that assigns units in 1’s group to treatment with 50-50 probability.
Hudgens and Halloran (2008)’s analysis defines marginal causal effects as contrasts between such marginal
potential outcomes.
More generally, we refer to the individual’s marginal potential outcome as yig(z;ψ) when i is assigned to
treatment value z and other treatment assignments are determined by an assignment regime characterized by
the parameter ψ, which describes the degree of treatment saturation. In the simple example in the preceding
paragraph, we have ψ = 0.50 to describe the regime where each unit is assigned to treatment using a Bernoulli
draw with p = 0.50, in which case the expected saturation is 50%. Under complete random assignment, which
fixes the number of treated and control units, ψ could index the share of units assigned to treatment.
Hudgens and Halloran (2008) consider four types of marginal causal effects: direct, indirect, total, and
overall effects. The direct effect for a particular unit corresponds to the difference between the unit’s
potential outcomes when its treatment assignment changes while the group treatment assignment is kept
fixed to a given saturation. Then, the group average direct causal effect, under treatment saturation ψ
and group size ng can be defined as τDg (ψ) = 1ng
∑ng
i=1 yig(1;ψ) − 1ng
∑ng
i=1 yig(0;ψ), and the population
average direct causal effect τD(ψ) (or simply, the average direct causal effect) is the average of τDg (ψ) across
groups. The indirect effect describes the effect on a unit of the treatment received by others in the group,
and is obtained from differences across saturation values ψ and φ. Thus, the group average indirect causal
effect is τ Ig (ψ, φ) = 1ng
∑ng
i=1 yig(0;ψ) − 1ng
∑ng
i=1 yig(0;φ), while the average indirect causal effect averages
across groups. The total causal effect combines the direct and indirect effects to capture the effect of being
directly treated and exposed to the treatment by others in the group. Thus, the group average total causal
effect is τTog (ψ, φ) = 1ng
∑ng
i=1 yig(1;ψ) − 1ng
∑ng
i=1 yig(0;φ), and the average total causal effect takes the
average of τTog (ψ, φ) across groups. Under no-interference, the indirect causal effect is zero and the total
causal effect equals the direct causal effect. Finally, the overall causal effect corresponds to the group’s
response to different treatment saturation levels. The group average overall causal effect can be written
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as τOg (ψ, φ) = 1ng
∑ng
i=1 yig(ψ)− 1ng
∑ng
i=1 yig(φ), where yig(ψ) is the average potential outcome for unit i in
group g under all possible assignments given saturation ψ. We average the τOg (ψ, φ) across groups to obtain
the average overall causal effect.
Under Bernoulli random assignment, these causal quantities are well defined and have a clean ceteris
paribus interpretation. Under any other design, the causal interpretation is not always clean. For example,
under complete random assignment the individual-level direct effect for unit i would contrast outcomes with
different numbers of group members other than i assigned to treatment (i.e., ψ(ng − 1) when i is assigned to
treatment and ψ(ng) when i is assigned to control). This point is discussed by Sävje, Aronow and Hudgens
(2017).
Let the observed outcome be Yig = yig(Zig) under the group treatment assignment Zig and suppose
treatment saturation is ψ. Given Bernoulli assignment with probability ψ, an unbiased estimator for
1
n
∑n
i=1 yig(z;ψ), with z = {0, 1}, is
ŷg(z;ψ) =
∑n
i=1 YigI(Zig = z)∑n
i=1 I(Zig = z)
,
and for the population average potential outcome, it is
ŷ(z;ψ) =
∑G
g=1 ŷg(z;ψ)I(Sg = ψ)∑G
g=1 I(Sg = ψ)
,
where Sg is the saturation level of group g (conditionally on the denominators of these estimators being
nonzero). Therefore, an unbiased estimator for the average direct effect is τ̂D(ψ) = ŷ(1;ψ)− ŷ(0;ψ). Unbiased
estimators for the other causal estimands of interest are defined analogously: τ̂ I(ψ, φ) = ŷ(0;ψ)− ŷ(0;φ),
τ̂To(ψ, φ) = ŷ(1;ψ)− ŷ(0;φ), and τ̂O(ψ, φ) = ŷ(ψ)− ŷ(φ), where ŷ(ψ) is the average across groups assigned
to saturation ψ of the average observed outcomes of units in the group under treatment assignment Zig.
For inference, Hudgens and Halloran (2008) derive variance estimators under an assumption called
stratified interference. This refers to the situation where potential outcomes for unit i in group g do not vary
on the basis of which other units in group g are assigned to treatment, only in the number or share of other
units assigned to treatment. This assumption reduces the problem statistically to the usual stratified setting
without interference. When stratified interference holds, their proposed variance estimators are unbiased if
unit causal effects are additive (e.g., yig(1, ψ) = yig(0, ψ) + d, where d is constant), and otherwise positively
biased. Liu and Hudgens (2014a) discuss conditions for asymptotic normality. Tchetgen and VanderWeele
(2012) extend Hudgens and Halloran (2008)’s results, providing conservative variance estimators, a framework
for finite sample inference with binary outcomes, and extensions to observational studies. Liu and Hudgens
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(2014b) develop asymptotic results for two-stage designs.
Both Sinclair, McConnell and Green (2012) and Baird et al. (2017) discuss statistical power for hierarchical
designs. Baird et al. (2017) offer thorough consideration of the optimal choice (in terms of statistical power) of
saturation levels (ψ and φ) and a distribution of these levels over groups for estimating direct, indirect, total,
and overall effects. Their methods assume the population is partitioned into equal-sized non overlapping
groups, that partial interference and stratified interference hold, and a linear-in-means outcome model. The
optimal set of saturations and shares of groups assigned to each saturation depends on the correlation of
potential outcomes within groups.
We show with a toy example how to compute these estimators and their variance. Suppose we have 18
units equally divided in 6 groups. In the first stage half of the groups are assigned to saturation ψ and the
other half to φ with equal probability. In the second stage, using complete random assignment two-thirds
of units in groups with saturation ψ are assigned to the treatment condition and one-third to the control
condition, and one-third of units in groups with saturation φ are assigned to treatment, while two-thirds to
control. For the purposes of the simulation, we will assume stratified interference and compute potential
outcomes under a dilated effects scenario such that yig(1, ψ) = 2× yig(0, φ), yig(1, φ) = 1.5× yig(0, φ), and
yig(0, ψ) = 1.25× yig(0, φ), where yig(0, φ) is obtained with a random draw from an absolute standard normal
distribution.
We display the structure of the post-treatment data that the experimenter has to have to compute the
estimators. (We show the data of six units only.) In this case, the realized saturation for group 1 is ψ (the
group is assigned to the treatment condition in the first stage as indicated in column “group_tr” with value
1, and 2/3 of units within the group are treated in the second stage as shown in column “indiv_tr”) and for
group 4 is φ (the group is assigned to the control condition in the first stage, and therefore 1/3 of units are
treated in the second stage):
post_tr_data[c(1:3,10:12),]
group group_tr indiv_tr obs_outcome
1 1 1 0 1.9269359
2 1 1 1 0.2788864
3 1 1 1 0.9606388
10 4 0 1 0.9062178
11 4 0 0 1.0599419
12 4 0 0 0.6051009
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The estimators and their variance are computed under the stratified interference assumption with the
following function from the interference package:
estimates <- estimates_hierarchical(post_tr_data)
causal_effects <- unlist(estimates[[1]])
variance <- unlist(estimates[[2]])
causal_effects
direct_psi_hat direct_phi_hat indirect_hat total_hat overall_hat
1.0009851 0.2318532 0.2195894 1.2205745 0.8096284
variance
var_direct_psi_hat var_direct_phi_hat var_indirect_hat
0.71255260 0.04854851 0.28000088
var_total_hat var_overall_hat
0.88936810 0.39005445
5.2 Misspecifying partial interference
What happens when the experimenter assumes partial interference but in fact there is interference not only
within groups, but also across groups? We show that when partial interference does not hold, the proposed
estimators for the direct, indirect, total and overall causal effects are biased.
We assume a scenario in which groups belong to tracts and interference happens within groups and
across groups within tracts, but not across tracts. Each tract is composed of two groups. The sample size
is 450 units, equally divided into six groups. As before, units are assigned to treatment under a two-stage
randomized experiment, with treatment saturation set to ψ = 2/3 and baseline saturation to φ = 1/3. We
assume stratified interference at the level of tracts to compute unit potential outcomes. We continue to use a
dilated effects scenario, but in this case it is the proportion of treated units in the tract that matters, as
opposed to the proportion of treated units in the group.
Causal estimands are in this case defined as differences between unit potential outcomes, conditional on a
tract saturation. For example, the population average direct causal effect under treatment intensity ψ, tract
size ntr, and Tr tracts is now defined as τD(ψψ) = 1Tr
∑Tr
tr=1
[
1
ntr
∑ntr
i=1 yitr (1;ψψ)− 1ntr
∑ntr
i=1 yitr (0;ψψ)
]
.
The notation τD(ψψ) implies that the realized saturation for unit i’s group and the other group in i’s tract is
ψ. (In this example, 4/6 of the units in tract tr are assigned to the treatment condition, given that groups and
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tracts are of equal size.) However, when the interference dependency structure is misspecified, particularly,
when partial interference does not hold, τ̂D(ψ) is a biased estimator for τD(ψψ), given that it includes the
observed outcomes of units in groups with realized saturation ψ, in tracts where other groups are assigned
saturation φ. In other words, the estimator for the population average potential outcome under saturation ψ
is
ŷ(z;ψ) =
∑G
g=1 ŷg(z;ψψ)I(Sg = ψψ)∑G
g=1 I(Sg = ψψ)
+
∑G
g=1 ŷg(z;ψφ)I(Sg = ψφ)∑G
g=1 I(Sg = ψφ)
.
The average outcome across groups includes a mixture of the average of observed outcomes for units with
treatment z in a group with realized saturation ψ in a tract in which the realized saturation for the other group
is ψ, and the average of observed outcomes for units with treatment z in a group with realized saturation ψ
in a tract in which the realized saturation for the other group is φ.
In Figure 6 we compare the estimators of the direct, indirect, total and overall causal effects when the
partial interference is misspecified (top row) on the basis of the data generating process defined in the
preceding paragraphs, and when it is correctly specified (bottom row). The estimators are unbiased when
partial interference holds. However, the estimators are biased when partial interference does not hold, but
the experimenter assumes that it does (top row).
5.3 Empirical Studies
Sinclair, McConnell and Green (2012) assess peer effects within a large scale voter-mobilization hierarchical
experiment (of about 70,000 individuals) conducted in Chicago during a special election in 2009, using as
treatment social-pressure mailings which are sent shortly before the election and disclose whether a member
of the household has voted in prior elections. The goal is to estimate total causal effects of mailings and
indirect causal effects across and within households. In the first stage of randomization, neighborhoods
(which are about equal-sized with at most 15 households) are assigned to one of four different saturations:
100% of households in the neighborhood are treated, 50%, only one, or zero. In the second stage, households
are randomly assigned to treatment according to the neighborhood saturation, and exactly one individual
within each household is randomly selected to receive the social-pressure message. Therefore, in one-person
households, that person has probability one of being treated, and in two-person and three-person households,
each person has a one-half and one-third probability of receiving the treatment, respectively. The key
assumption is partial interference at the level of neighborhoods. The authors find positive total causal
effects of receiving the message on turnout and some evidence of within-household effects but no evidence of
interference across households.
Nickerson (2008) runs a two-stage placebo-controlled experiment where in the first stage, households
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Figure 6: The plot shows the distribution of point estimates for 3000 simulations with partial interference
specified at the level of groups only. In the upper-row the data generating process is with interference within
and across groups (general interference) and in the bottom-row within groups only (partial interference). The
dashed vertical line represents the value of the estimand.
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with two registered voters are assigned to either a 50% saturation, a 0% placebo, or a 0% pure control
saturation. In households assigned to the 50% saturation, residents who answer the door receive a face-to-face
get-out-the-vote message (GOTV condition), whereas in households assigned to the 0% placebo, residents
who answer get a recycling pitch (recycling condition). The experiment was conducted during the 2002
Congressional primaries in Denver and Minneapolis. Households were contacted the weekend before the
election. This design identifies the average direct effect of mobilization with a difference-in-means estimator
between observed voter turnout among reachable voters (those who answer the door) across the GOTV and
recycling conditions. Likewise, the average indirect effect is the difference-in-means between observed voter
turnout among unreachable residents (those who did not answer the door) across the GOTV condition and
recycling conditions. The author finds a statistically significant increase in turnout of unreachable residents
in GOTV households of about 6 percentage points, and of 9.8 percentage points among reachable residents,
suggesting that when one voter opens the door to a canvasser, 60% of the effect from the get-out-the-vote
appeal is transmitted to the other household member.
With the same design, Bond (2018) analyzes the data of a face-to-face canvassing experiment by Broockman
and Kalla (2016) encouraging active perspective taking intended to reduce transphobia. The effects of the
perspective taking exercise spill over to household residents who do not answer the door, reducing their
anti-transgender prejudice. Other empirical studies using a hierarchical design include Duflo and Saez (2003),
who analyze spillover effects in individuals’ choice of retirement plan, Miguel and Kremer (2004) that study
the effects of a deworming medical treatment on health and school participation of untreated children in
(partially) treated schools and of children in neighboring control schools. Similarly, Angelucci and De Giorgi
(2009) analyze indirect effects of the cash transfer program Progresa on consumption. In this case, only
the first stage is randomized assigning municipalities to treatment or control, while in the second stage a
subset of individuals are offered treatment based on their income. This design identifies direct and indirect
effects when there is partial interference, but cannot identify whether these effects vary with intensity of
treatment because there is no exogenous variation in treatment saturation. (This is also true of Nickerson
(2008)’s and Duflo and Saez (2003)’s design in which the group-level saturations are fixed at 50%.) A similar
case is presented by Sur et al. (2009), who study the effectiveness of a typhoid vaccine with a design that
randomly assigns geographic clusters to receive the vaccine or a placebo vaccine, but individuals self-selected
into treatment in the second stage. Likewise, the design by Wilke, Green and Cooper (2019) to study the
effectiveness of education-entertainment on attitudes towards violence against women, teacher absenteeism,
and abortion stigma, first assigned villages to treatments and in the second stage individuals self-selected into
treatment. Crépon et al. (2013) implement a two-stage hierarchical design in the context of a job placement
assistance program in France in which cities are assigned to either one of four positive saturations or a control
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condition, and then job seekers are randomly assigned to treatment according to their city saturation. The
program has positive direct effects, but negative spillover effects: the likelihood of finding a stable job for
untreated job seekers in positive saturation cities is smaller than for untreated job seekers in control areas.
Bhatti et al. (2017) combine a hierarchical design with network data on family ties to assess spillover
effects of a GOTV experiment that mobilized young voters with text messages during municipal and European
Parliament elections in Denmark, and Giné and Mansuri (2018) assess direct and indirect effects of a voter
awareness campaign on female turnout and candidate choice in Pakistan by assigning first geographical
clusters within villages to either one of two treatments or to control (with unequal probabilities because
the number of clusters varied by village) and then randomly targeting a subset of households in treatment
clusters. Basse and Feller (2018) evaluate an intervention to reduce student absenteeism in Philadelphia with
a two-stage randomization design in which households with multiple students were first assigned to treatment
or control, then exactly one student in treatment households was randomly selected for the student’s parents
to receive student-specific information. The authors address the practical problem presented to researchers
when household size varies (or when the number of geographical clusters across villages varies as in Giné
and Mansuri (2018)): whether to assign equal weight to individuals or to households, depending on what is
relevant from a policy perspective. The authors propose unbiased estimators for individual and household
weighted estimands.
6 Contagion
By analogy to biological contagion, (social) contagion refers to processes through which the outcomes of
one unit causally affect the outcomes of another unit. Such processes were illustrated above in Figure 1
as the path Y1 → Y2. In these narrow terms, contagion is distinct from interference. That said, contagion
can be a mechanism through which interference occurs, and one that may call into question assuming a
particular exposure mapping that limits the extent of interference (Manski, 2013; Eckles, Karrer and Ugander,
2017). Assessing whether spillover effects are due to contagion amounts to conducting a mediation analysis,
where the mediators are treated units’ outcomes (VanderWeele, Tchetgen and Halloran, 2012; Ogburn and
VanderWeele, 2017). This was displayed in Figure 1 as the path Z1 → Y1 → Y2, where Y1 is the mediator in
the contagion process. To evaluate whether spillover effects are due to contagion, conditions must hold so
as to identify both spillover effects (as discussed in this chapter) as well as mediation effects. Identifying
mediation effects requires that other types of conditional independence hold, such as sequential ignorabilty
(Imai, Keele and Yamamoto, 2010; Pearl, 2014). These are strong assumptions about the data generating
process and typically cannot be induced directly by an experimental design (Imai, Tingley and Yamamoto,
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2013).
Imai and Jiang (2019) re-analyze the two-stage placebo-controlled get-out-the-vote (GOTV) experiment
by Nickerson (2008). Their goal is to analyze whether canvassing increases the turnout of the voter who does
not answer via effects on the vote intention of the reachable voter (contagion), or via other channels such
as conversations within the household (non-contagion spillover). They start with a decomposition of the
indirect effect into the sum of a contagion effect—canvassing influences the turnout of the untreated voter of
a contacted household by changing the vote intention of the treated voter (approximated by turnout)—and
effects due to other mechanisms. With reference to the setting of Nickerson (2008), this decomposition
is based on the following: there is no spillover across households, reachable voters form a vote intention
immediately after being contacted, where we denote potential vote intention as y∗i1(zi) ∈ {0, 1}, and the
turnout of all voters and all households is observed. Let yi1(zi) and yi2(zi, y∗i1(zi)) represent the potential
voting outcome of reachable and unreachable voters in complier household i, respectively. Causal quantities
of interest are defined only for compliers (that is, residents of households where someone answers the door).
As such, the analysis is limited to households in which someone answered the door either in the canvassing or
the placebo (recycling) conditions.
The indirect effect of the GOTV campaign is thus defined as the difference in the potential outcomes of
unreachable voters when their household is assigned to the GOTV condition (zi = 1) as opposed to a control
condition (zi = 0). The average indirect effect is obtained by taking the average difference across complier
households and can be expressed (in terms of a finite population of Nc complier households) as
θ = 1
Nc
Nc∑
i=1
yi2(1, y∗i1(1))− yi2(0, y∗i1(0)).
Then, θ is decomposed into the sum of the contagion effect and the effect of other mechanisms by considering
the vote intention of the treated voter y∗i1 as the mediator. Imai and Jiang (2019) define an “average contagion
effect” as follows (again, written in terms of a finite population of Nc complier households):
γ(z) = 1
Nc
Nc∑
i=1
yi2(z, y∗i1(1))− yi2(z, y∗i1(0)).
Note that it is possible for y∗i1(1) = y∗i1(0), in which case there would be no contagion effect for household i.
The quantity γ(z) thus aggregates over cases where there could or could not be contagion effects, and then
for the former, over the magnitude of any contagion effect. It is therefore analogous to what is known as a
“natural” effect, rather than a “controlled” effect, in the mediation literature (Imai, Keele and Yamamoto,
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2010). Other, non-contagion mechanisms are captured by
η(z) = 1
Nc
Nc∑
i=1
yi2(1, y∗i1(z))− yi2(0, y∗i1(z)).
The indirect effect can be decomposed as θ = γ(1) + η(0) = γ(0) + η(1).
Identification of this decomposition requires a sequential ignorability assumption from mediation analysis.
Such assumption implies that conditional on treatment status and pre-treatment covariates, the vote intention
of the treated voter is independent of the potential outcome of the unreachable voter. This assumption
would be violated in the presence of unobserved confounders (such as political efficacy) that affect both the
vote intention of the reachable voter and turnout of the unreachable voter. It is important to note that this
assumption is stronger than the usual ignorability condition necessary for observational studies because it
requires so-called “cross-world independence assumptions”—i.e., assumptions about potential outcomes that
can never be revealed by experimentation. Under this key assumption, Imai and Jiang (2019) estimate that
indirect effects can be largely explained by contagion, even for households whose treated voter is a Democrat
and unreachable voter is a Republican. Because this mediation analysis involves such strong assumptions, the
authors reasonably conduct a sensitivity analysis, examining how robust these conclusions are to violations of
the sequential ignorability assumption.
Other empirical studies exploring contagion effects include Forastiere, Mealli and VanderWeele (2016),
who analyze contagion of an encouragement program on households’ use of bed nets in Zambia. Relying on
semi-parametric outcome models, Ferrali et al. (2018) study the effects of an encouragement campaign on
the adoption of a new political communication technology in Uganda, and Vásquez-Cortés (2018) leverages
exogenous shocks to analyze contagion effects of criminal behavior among ex-combatants in Colombia. One
way analysis of contagion can avoid the strong sequential ignorability assumptions is to instead assume
complete mediation (i.e., an exclusion restriction of instrumental variables estimation) such that all spillover
effects are due to contagion via a particular outcome; for example, Eckles, Kizilcec and Bakshy (2016) conduct
an experiment in which they posit that treatment of an individual’s peers only affects them via specific
directed behaviors.
7 Conclusion
Standard methods for analyzing experiments assume no interference, which assumes that a unit’s own
treatment status is all that one needs to know to characterize its outcome. In many settings, including many
of the empirical examples discussed in this chapter, such an assumption is unwarranted. Such spillovers
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may merely represent a nuisance for estimating quantities of interest. In such cases, experimenters may
want to introduce adjustments to their designs so as to minimize the potential for exposure to other units.
Alternatively, experimenters could try working at a higher level of aggregation at which interference is less
likely to be a concern. On the other hand, researchers may have a substantive interest in estimating spillover
effects. This chapter presumed such an interest and proposed methods for doing so.
We reviewed two analytical frameworks for estimating spillover effects in experiments. In the first, the
structure of interference is known but can be of almost arbitrary form. In the second, the interference
structure is mostly unknown except that the experimenter can be confident that interference is fully contained
within non-overlapping groups. We demonstrated how one can work under either framework to estimate
spillover effects using the interference R package. We also illustrate the implications of specifying the nature
and extent of interference.
Our review of empirical studies demonstrates the relevance of spillover effects to various social phenomena,
such as voting, petitioning, student behavior, norms against violence, prejudice, economic decisions, and
subjective well-being. These studies also offer examples of designs that operationalize the analytical frameworks.
We hope that the analytical foundation and examples provided can help experimenters to push both the
methodological and empirical frontiers in our understanding of spillover effects.
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